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Abstract—We propose a secure transmission scheme for a
relay wiretap channel, where a source communicates with a
destination via a decode-and-forward relay in the presence of
spatially random-distributed eavesdroppers. We assume that the
source is equipped with multiple antennas, whereas the relay,
the destination, and the eavesdroppers are equipped with a
single antenna each. In the proposed scheme, in addition to
information signals, the source transmits artificial noise signals
in order to confuse the eavesdroppers. With the target of
maximizing the secrecy throughput of the relay wiretap channel,
we derive a closed-form expression for the transmission outage
probability and an easy-to-compute expression for the secrecy
outage probability. Using these expressions, we determine the
optimal power allocation factor and wiretap code rates that
guarantee the maximum secrecy throughput, while satisfying a
secrecy outage probability constraint. Furthermore, we examine
the impact of source antenna number on the secrecy throughput,
showing that adding extra transmit antennas at the source brings
about a significant increase in the secrecy throughput.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless communications are inherently insecure, due to
the broadcast nature of the medium, which makes security
a pivotal design issue in the implementation and operation
of current and future wireless networks. Compared to the
traditional key-based cryptographic techniques that are applied
to upper layers, physical layer security can enhance the secrecy
of wireless communications without using secret keys and
complex encryption/decryption algorithms, and thus has been
recognized as an alternative for cryptographic techniques. The
key idea of physical layer security is to exploit the randomness
of wireless channels to offer secure data transmissions [1,
2]. In early studies, e.g., [3], the principle of physical layer
security was established in a single-input single-output wire-
tap channel. Subsequently, physical layer security in multi-
input multi-output (MIMO) communication systems has been
intensively investigated [4–15], due to the benefits of MIMO
techniques such as high data rate and high link reliability.
Most recently, physical layer security in large-scale wireless
networks, such as mobile ad hoc and sensor networks, has
been receiving considerable attention [16–19]. A key property
of large-scale wireless networks is that the node locations
in the network were spatially randomly distributed. As such,
stochastic geometry and random geometric graphs are used
for modeling the locations of spatially random-distributed
nodes. In [16], the throughput of large-scale decentralized
wireless networks with physical layer security constraints was
investigated. Considering the path loss as the sole factor
influencing the received signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at the
receiver, [17] examined the secrecy rate in cellular networks.
In [18] the secrecy rate achieved by linear precoding was ana-
lyzed in the broadcast channel with spatially random external
eavesdroppers, and in [19] the secrecy rate achieved by linear
precoding in cellular networks was analyzed.
We note that [16–19] only considered point-to-point trans-
missions. This leaves physical layer security with cooperative
relays in large-scale networks as an open problem. Since the
relay channel efficiently improves the coverage and reliability
in wireless networks [20, 21], it is of practical significance
to investigate the secrecy performance of such channels.
Particularly important in this context would be extensions of
previous work on relay wiretap channels which focused on
scenarios where the location of an eavesdropper(s) is fixed
and known at the source (e.g., [22–27]).
In this work we propose a secure transmission scheme for
a relay wiretap channel, where a source transmits to a desti-
nation via a decode-and-forward (DF) relay in the presence
of multiple spatially random-distributed eavesdroppers. The
source is equipped with multiple antennas, while the relay,
the destination, and the eavesdropper are equipped with a
single antenna each. In addition to information signals, we
assume that the source transmit artificial noise signals in
order to confuse the eavesdroppers. Aiming at maximizing
the secrecy throughput, while satisfying a secrecy outage
probability constraint, we determine both the optimal power
allocation factor between AN signals and information signals
and the optimal wiretap code rates.
Compared to current studies on physical layer security in
relay networks [22–27], our contributions are threefold. First,
we consider a more practical scenario where the locations
of the eavesdroppers are spatially randomly distributed and
not known at the source. Second, we propose a new secure
transmission scheme that maximizes the secrecy throughput
in such a scenario. Third, we derive explicit expressions for
the transmission outage probability and the secrecy outage
probability, which enable us to analytically characterize the
secrecy throughput of the relay wiretap channel. We note that
these expressions are independent of realizations of the main
channel and the eavesdropper channel.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section
Fig. 1: Illustration of a relay wiretap channel with spatially
random eavesdroppers.
scheme. In Section III, we analyze and optimize the secrecy
performance achieved by the proposed scheme. Numerical
results and related discussions are presented in Section IV.
Finally, Section V draws conclusions.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROPOSED SCHEME
We consider a relay wiretap channel, as depicted in Fig. 1,
where a source (S) communicates with a destination (D) with
the aid of a relay (R) in the presence of multiple spatially
random eavesdroppers. We assume that the source is equipped
with N antennas, while the destination, the relay, and the
eavesdroppers are equipped with a single antenna each. We
also assume that there is no direct link between the source and
the destination. We denote dsr and drd as the distance between
the source and the relay and the distance between the relay
and the destination, respectively, and denote η as the path loss
exponent. As in [16–19], the eavesdroppers are modeled as
a homogeneous Poisson Point Process (PPP) Φ with density
λ. This model is practical and representative for decentralized
networks where each node is randomly distributed [28]. The
source, the relay, and the destination do not belong to Φ.
A. Transmission Scheme
We now detail the proposed transmission scheme. The
proposed scheme utilizes two time slots. In the first time slot,
the source transmits information signals together with AN
signals to the relay. In this time slot, the transmitted signals
from the source are overheard by the eavesdroppers. The role
of the AN signals is to confuse the eavesdroppers. In the
second time slot, we assume that the source is silent. While it
is clear that this will lead to a sub-optimal solution, such an
assumption does allow for analytical tractability in a special
case. Removing this assumption means more power can be
added to the signal in the first time slot. Our other work [29],
in which we consider multiple antennae at all nodes, quantifies
the advantage of adding source noise in the second time slot.
We also assume the relay transmits the received signals to
the destination using the DF protocol. In this time slot, the
broadcast signals are also overheard by the eavesdroppers.
We assume that all the channels are subject to independent
and identically distributed Rayleigh fading. We also assume a
quasi-static block fading environment in which all the channel
coefficients remain the same within one time slot. We denote
hsr as the 1×N channel vector from the source to the relay
and denote hrd as the channel coefficient from the relay to the
destination.
We now express the transmitted and received signals in two
time slots separately. In the first time slot, the transmitted
signal at the source is given by
xS = Wt, (1)
where W denotes theN×N beamforming matrix at the source
and t denotes the combination of the information signal and
the AN signal. To perform a such transmission, we first design
W as
W =
[
wS WAN
]
, (2)
where wS is used to transmit the information signal and WAN
is used to transmit the AN signal. The aim of W is to degrade
the quality of the received signals at the eavesdroppers. By
transmitting AN signals into the null space of hsr through
W, the source ensures that the quality of the received signals
at the relay is free from AN interference. In designing W,
we choose wS as the eigenvector corresponding to the largest
eigenvalue of hHsrhsr. We then choose WAN as the remaining
N − 1 eigenvectors of hHsrhsr. Such a design ensures that W
is a unitary matrix. We then design t as
t =
[
tS
tAN
]
, (3)
where tS denotes the information signal and tAN is an
(N − 1)×1 vector of the AN signal. We define β, 0 < β ≤ 1,
as the fraction of the power allocated to the information
signal. As such, we obtain E
[
|tS|2
]
= β and E
[
tANt
H
AN
]
=
1−β
N−1IN−1, where E [·] is expectation and Im is the m × m
identity matrix. Moreover, we confirm that E
[
xSx
H
S
]
= IN .
Based on (1), (2), and (3), the received signal at the relay in
the first time slot is expressed as
yr =
√
Psd
−η
sr hsrwStS + nr, (4)
where Ps denotes the transmit power at the source, and nr
denotes the thermal noise at the relay, which is assumed to be
a zero mean complex Gaussian random variable with variance
σ2r , i.e., nr ∼ CN
(
0, σ2r
)
.
We next express the received signal at a typical eavesdrop-
per located at i, i ∈ Φ, in the first time slot as
y
(1)
i =
√
Psd
−η
si hsiwStS +
√
Psd
−η
si hsiWANtAN + ni1, (5)
where hsi denotes the 1×N channel vector from the source
to the typical eavesdropper located at i, dsi denotes the
distance between the source and the typical eavesdropper
located at i, and ni1 denotes the thermal noise at the typical
eavesdropper located at i, which is assumed to be a zero
mean complex Gaussian random variable with variance σ2i1,
i.e., ni1 ∼ CN
(
0, σ2i1
)
.
In the second time slot, the relay adopts the DF protocol
to forward signals to the destination. Specifically, the relay
first decodes the transmitted signals from the source and then
broadcasts them after re-encoding. Therefore, we express the
received signal at the destination as
yd =
√
Prd
−η
rd hrdxR + nd, (6)
where Pr denotes the transmit power at the relay, hrd denotes
the channel coefficient from the relay to the destination, xR
denotes the transmitted signal of the relay with E
[
‖xR‖2
]
= 1,
and nd denotes the thermal noise at the destination, which is
assumed to be a zero mean complex random variable with
variance σ2d , i.e., nd ∼ CN
(
0, σ2d
)
.
We next express the received signal in the second time slot
at the typical eavesdropper located at i is expressed as
y
(2)
i =
√
Prd
−η
ri hrixR + ni2, (7)
where hri denotes the channel coefficient from the relay to
the typical eavesdropper located at i, dri denotes the distance
between the relay and the typical eavesdropper located at i, and
ni2 denotes the thermal noise at the the typical eavesdropper
located at i, which is assumed to be a zero mean complex
random variable with variance σ2i2, i.e., ni2 ∼ CN
(
0, σ2i2
)
.
B. Received SNRs
We express the instantaneous SNR at the destination as
ΓD = min {γsr, γrd} , (8)
where γsr = βPsdηsrσ2r ‖hsr‖
2 and γrd = Prdη
rd
σ2
d
‖hrd‖2. For
the instantaneous SNR at the eavesdroppers, we assume
that the eavesdroppers are non-colluding, which means that
each eavesdropper decodes her own received signals from
the source and the relay, without cooperating with other
eavesdroppers. Thus, we express the instantaneous SNR at the
eavesdroppers as1
ΓE = max
i∈Φ
{max {γsi, γri}} , (9)
where
γsi =
βPsd
−η
si ‖hsiwS‖
2
1−β
N−1Psd
−η
si hsiWANW
H
ANh
H
si + σ
2
i1
. (10)
and γri = Prdη
ri
σ2
i2
‖hri‖2.
C. Problem Formulation
In order to evaluate and optimize the secrecy performance
achieved by our proposed scheme, we apply the performance
metric proposed in [9], which is given by
Ts =
1
2
(Rb −Re) (1− Pto) , (11)
where the factor 1/2 is due to the two time slots used in
the transmission, (Rb, Re) denotes a parameter pair of the
wiretap code used by the source, Rb denotes the transmission
1We assume that the source and the relay use different wiretap codes with
different codebooks. As such, the transmitted signals from the source and relay
cannot be jointly processed by any eavesdropper (nor by any combination of
eavesdroppers).
rate of the wiretap code, Re denotes the cost of preventing
the transmitted wiretap code from eavesdropping, and Pto
denotes the transmission outage probability (Pto is defined as
the probability that the instantaneous SNR at the destination
is less than τb = 2Rb − 1). Mathematically, Pto is formulated
as
Pto = Pr (ΓD ≤ τb) . (12)
Henceforth, we refer to Ts as the secrecy throughput.
The goal of this work is to maximize the secrecy throughput
of the relay wiretap channel with spatially random eaves-
droppers under secrecy constraints. To achieve this goal, we
formulate the design problem as
max
Rb,Re,β
Ts,
s.t. Pso ≤ ϕ, 0 ≤ Re ≤ Rb, 0 < β ≤ 1, (13)
where Pso denotes the secrecy outage probability. Pso is
defined as the probability that ΓE is larger than τe = 2Re− 1.
Mathematically, Pso is formulated as
Pso = Pr (ΓE > τe) . (14)
III. ANALYSIS AND OPTIMIZATION OF SECRECY
PERFORMANCE
In this section, we first analyze the secrecy performance by
deriving explicit expressions for the transmission probability
and the secrecy outage probability, respectively. Based on
these results we determine the optimal parameters, e.g., Rb,
Re, and β, that achieve the optimal secrecy performance of the
relay wiretap channel. Notably, the determined optimal secrecy
performance is independent of realizations of the main channel
and the eavesdroppers’ channels.
A. Transmission Outage Probability
In this subsection we focus on the transmission outage
probability, Pto. We first obtain the cumulative distribution
functions (CDFs) of γsr and γrd as
Fγsr (γ) = 1− exp
(
−
γ
βγsr
)N−1∑
n=0
1
n!
(
γ
βγsr
)n
(15)
with γsr = Psd−ηsr σ−2r , and
Fγrd (γ) = 1− exp
(
−
γ
γrd
)
(16)
with γrd = Prd
−η
rd σ
−2
d . Based on (8), (15), and (16), we re-
express the transmission outage probability in (12) as
Pto =Pr (min {γsr, γrd} ≤ τb)
=1− (1− Fγsr (τb)) (1− Fγrd (τb))
=1− exp
(
−
(
1
βγsr
+
1
γrd
)
τb
)N−1∑
n=0
1
n!
(
τb
βγsr
)n
.
(17)
B. Secrecy Outage Probability
We now focus on the secrecy outage probability, Pso. To
derive Pso, we first express the CDFs of γsi and γri as
Fγsi (γ) = 1−
(
1 +
(1− β) γ
β (N − 1)
)−(N−1)
exp
(
−
γ
βγsi
)
(18)
with γsi = Psd
−η
si σ
−2
i1 , and
Fγri (γ) = 1− exp
(
−
γ
γri
)
(19)
with γri = Prd
−η
ri σ
−2
i2 . Based on (9), (18) and (19), we present
the secrecy outage probability in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: The secrecy outage of the relay wiretap chan-
nel is derived as
Pso = 1− exp (−2λ (J1 + J2 − J3)) , (20)
where
J1 =
pi
η
(
βPs
τeσ2i1
) 2
η
(
1 +
(1− β) τe
β (N − 1)
)−(N−1)
Γ
(
2
η
)
, (21)
J2 =
∫
∞
0
∫ pi
0
dsi exp (−ψ (θ)) ddsidθ, (22)
J3 =
(
1 +
(1− β) τe
β (N − 1)
)−(N−1)
×
∫
∞
0
∫ pi
0
dsi exp
(
−
τeσ
2
i1
βPs
dηsi
)
exp (−ψ (θ)) ddsidθ,
(23)
and ψ (θ) = τeσ
2
i2
Pr
(
d2sr + d
2
si − 2dsrdsi cos θ
) η
2
.
Proof: See Appendix A.
We find that (20) provides an easy-to-compute expression
for the secrecy outage probability. Despite that J2 and J3 for
general η can not be obtained in closed-form, they can be
easily evaluated since only a double integral is involved in J2
and J3.
We next present simplified closed-form expressions for the
special case where η = 2. For this special case, we first
simplify J2, which yields a closed-form expression given by
(24) (next page), where (a) follows by applying the expression
of the zero-order modified Bessel function I0(z), (b) follows
by applying the series representation of I0(z), (c) follows by
using t = τeσ
2
i2
Pr
d2si and noting that∫
∞
0
tk exp (−t) dt = Γ (k + 1) , (25)
and (d) follows by applying the series expression representa-
tion of the exponential function. Similarly, for the special case
where η = 2, we simplify J3, which yields a closed-form ex-
pression given by (26) (next page). The simplified expressions
in (24) and (26) offer us a computationally efficient way to
calculate the secrecy outage probability for the special case
where η = 2.
C. Throughput Optimization
In this subsection we determine the optimal parameters
that maximize the secrecy throughput, Ts, for general η.
Specifically, we first determine the optimal wiretap code rates
pair, (R∗b , R∗e), that maximizes the secrecy throughput for
a given power allocation factor β. We then determine the
joint optimal power allocation factor and wiretap code rates,
(β∗◦, R∗◦b , R
∗◦
e ), that maximizes Ts.
1) Optimal wiretap code rates pair for a given β: The
optimal wiretap code rates pair, (R∗b , R∗e), that maximizes Ts
for a given β is determined as
(R∗b , R
∗
e) = argmax Ts,
s.t. Pso ≤ ϕ, 0 ≤ Re ≤ Rb. (27)
Taking the first-order derivative of Pso with respect to Re,
we confirm that ∂Pso/∂Re < 0, which states that Pso
monotonically decreases as Re increases. As such, the value
of R∗e satisfying (27) is the value of R∗e that satisfies the
secrecy outage probability constraint, i.e., Pso (R∗e) = ϕ. We
then confirm that ∂Ts/∂Rb is first positive then negative as
Rb increases. This demonstrates that the value of R∗b satisfying
(27) is unique. Although a closed-form solution for (R∗b , R∗e) is
mathematically intractable, we are able to determine the values
of (R∗b , R∗e) numerically. Accordingly, the maximal secrecy
throughput based on the values of (R∗b , R∗e) for a given β is
defined as T ∗s .
2) Joint optimization of β, Rb, and Re: The joint optimal
power allocation factor and wiretap code rates which maxi-
mizes Ts in (11), (β∗◦, R∗◦b , R∗◦e ), is determined as
(β∗◦, R∗◦b , R
∗◦
e ) = argmax Ts,
s.t. Pso ≤ ϕ, 0 ≤ Re ≤ Rb, 0 < β ≤ 1. (28)
Using (17) and (20), we are able to solve (28) numerically.
Specifically, we first determine the value of (R∗b , R∗e) using
(27) for each value of β. This leads to the secrecy throughput
with (R∗b , R∗e), denoted by T ∗s = 12 (R
∗
b −R
∗
e) (1− Pto). We
then determine the value of β that maximizes T ∗s , denoted
by β∗◦. Accordingly, the value of (R∗b , R∗e) associated with
β∗◦ is determined as (R∗◦b , R∗◦e ). Finally, the maximal secrecy
throughput based on the values of β∗◦, R∗◦b , and R∗◦e is defined
as T ∗◦s .
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section we present numerical results to validate our
analysis of the outage probabilities and examine the benefits of
the proposed scheme. For illustrative purpose, throughout this
section we concentrate on the practical example of a highly
shadowed urban area with η = 4. In addition, we adopt λd2sr =
λd2rd = 1.
We first verify the accuracy of the transmission outage
probability and the secrecy outage probability using Monte
Carlo simulations. In Fig. 2, we plot Pto versus τb for
different values of γb with N = 4 and β = 0.5. In this
figure, we consider γsr = γrd = γb. We first see that the
analytical curves, generated from (17), precisely match the
J2 =exp
(
−
τeσ
2
i2
Pr
d2sr
)∫
∞
0
dsi exp
(
−
τeσ
2
i2
Pr
d2si
)∫ pi
0
exp
(
2τeσ
2
i2
Pr
dsrdsi cos θ
)
dθddsi
(a)
=pi exp
(
−
τeσ
2
i2
Pr
d2sr
)∫
∞
0
dsi exp
(
−
τeσ
2
i2
Pr
d2si
)
I0
(
2τeσ
2
i2
Pr
dsrdsi
)
ddsi
(b)
=pi exp
(
−
τeσ
2
i2
Pr
d2sr
)∫
∞
0
dsi exp
(
−
τeσ
2
i2
Pr
d2si
) ∞∑
k=0
1
(k!)
2
(
τeσ
2
i2
Pr
dsrdsi
)2k
ddsi
(c)
=
piPr
2τeσ2i2
exp
(
−
τeσ
2
i2
Pr
d2sr
) ∞∑
k=0
1
(k!)2
(
τeσ
2
i2
Pr
d2sr
)k
Γ (k + 1)
(d)
=
piPr
2τeσ2i2
. (24)
J3 =
(
1 +
(1− β) τe
β (N − 1)
)−(N−1)
exp
(
−
τeσ
2
i2
Pr
d2sr
)∫
∞
0
dsi exp
(
−
(
τeσ
2
i1
βPs
+
τeσ
2
i2
Pr
)
d2si
)∫ pi
0
exp
(
2τeσ
2
i2
Pr
dsrdsi cos θ
)
dθddsi
=
piβPsPr
2τe (βPsσ2i2 + Prσ
2
i1)
exp
(
−
τeσ
2
i1σ
2
i2
βPsσ2i2 + Prσ
2
i1
d2sr
)(
1 +
(1− β) τe
β (N − 1)
)−(N−1)
. (26)
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Fig. 2: Pto versus τb for different values of γb with η = 4,
N = 4, and β = 0.5.
simulation points, which demonstrates the correctness of our
expression for Pto in (17). Second, we see that Pto increases
monotonically as τb increases for a given γb, which implies
that the transmission outage probability increases when the
transmission rate of the wiretap code increases. We further
see that Pto decreases as γb increases for a given τb. This
reveals that the transmission outage probability reduces when
the source and the relay use more power to transmit under a
fixed τb.
In Fig. 3, we plot Pso versus τe for different values of
γe with N = 4 and β = 0.5. In this figure we consider
γsrσ
2
r/σ
2
i1 = γrdσ
2
d/σ
2
i2 = γe. We see an excellent match
between the analytical curves generated from (20) and the sim-
ulation points, demonstrating the correctness of our expression
for Pso in (20). We then see that Pso decreases monotonically
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Fig. 3: Pso versus τe for different values of γe with η = 4,
N = 4, and β = 0.5.
as τe increases for a given γe, which shows that the secrecy
outage probability decreases when the redundancy rate of the
wiretap code increases. We further observe that Pso increases
as γe increases. This is due to the fact the eavesdroppers
receive signals from both the source and the relay. It follows
that increasing the transmit power at the source and the relay
leads to an improved received SNR at the eavesdroppers.
We now examine the impact of the system parameters Rb
and β on the secrecy throughput. In Fig. 4, we plot Ts versus
Rb for different values of N with a fixed β and the optimal Re.
We first observe that there exists a unique R∗b that maximizes
Ts for a given β. We also observe that the maximal Ts for
a given β, i.e., T ∗s , increases as N increases. This shows
that adding extra transmit antennas at the source significantly
enhances the secrecy performance of the relay wiretap channel.
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Fig. 4: Ts versus Rb for different values of N with η = 4,
β = 0.5, ϕ = 0.4, γb = 20 dB, and γb/γe = 20.
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ϕ = 0.4, γb = 20 dB, and γb/γe = 20.
In Fig. 5, we plot T ∗s versus β for different values of N . For
each point of T ∗s , we choose the (R∗b , R∗e) pair that maximizes
Ts for the corresponding β. We first observe that there exists a
unique β∗◦ that maximizes T ∗s . We then observe that the value
of β∗◦ that maximizes T ∗s is around 0.9, which demonstrates
that the secrecy throughput is improved if approximately 10%
of the total transmit power at the source is allocated to AN
signals. We also observe that the maximal T ∗s , i.e., T ∗◦s ,
increases as N increases. Furthermore, we observe that the
value of β∗◦ slightly decreases as N increases, which shows
that in order to maintain the optimal secrecy throughput, the
power allocated to AN must increase as the source antenna
number increases.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work we proposed a secure transmission scheme for a
relay wiretap channel, in which an N -antenna source transmits
both information signals and AN signals in the presence of
multiple spatially random single-antenna eavesdroppers. Con-
ditioned on the use of a decode-and-forward protocol at the
relay, we determined the optimal parameters (β∗◦, R∗◦b , R∗◦e )
that maximizes the secrecy throughput, based on our derived
expressions for the transmission outage probability and the
secrecy outage probability. In addition, we examined the
impact of N on the secrecy throughput, showing how the
maximal secrecy throughput increases with N . The work
reported here provides valuable insights into the design of new
physical layer security schemes in which the locations of the
eavesdroppers are randomly distributed and not known at the
source.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
According to (9), (18) and (19), we re-express (14) as
Pso = 1− Pr {ΓE ≤ τe}
= 1− Pr
{
max
i∈Φ
{max {γsi, γri}} ≤ τe
}
= 1− EΦ
[∏
i∈Φ
Pr {max {γsi, γri} ≤ τe}
]
= 1− EΦ
[∏
i∈Φ
(
1−
(
1 +
(1− β) τe
β (N − 1)
)−(N−1)
× exp
(
−
τe
βγsi
))(
1− exp
(
−
τe
γri
))]
(a)
= 1− exp (−2λ (J1 + J2 − J3)) . (29)
where
J1 =
∫
∞
0
∫ pi
0
dsi
((
1 +
(1− β) τe
β (N − 1)
)−(N−1)
× exp
(
−
τeσ
2
i1
βPs
dηsi
))
ddsidθ, (30)
J2 =
∫
∞
0
∫ pi
0
dsi exp
(
−
τeσ
2
i2
Pr
dηri
)
ddsidθ, (31)
and
J3 =
∫
∞
0
∫ pi
0
dsi
(
1 +
(1− β) τe
β (N − 1)
)−(N−1)
× exp
(
−
τeσ
2
i1
βPs
dηsi −
τeσ
2
i2
Pr
dηri
)
ddsidθ, (32)
and (a) follows by applying the probability generating func-
tional (PGFL) for the PPP Φ, given by [30]
EΦ
[∏
x∈Φ
f (x)
]
= exp
{
−
∫
R2
[1− f (x)]λdx
}
, (33)
and by changing to polar coordinates.
To proceed, we first derive J1 as
J1 = pi
(
1 +
(1− β) τe
β (N − 1)
)−(N−1)
×
∫
∞
0
dsi exp
(
−
τeσ
2
i1
βPs
dηsi
)
ddsi
(b)
=
pi
2
(
1 +
(1− β) τe
β (N − 1)
)−(N−1)
×
∫
∞
0
exp
(
−
τeσ
2
i1
βPs
u
η
2
)
du
(c)
=
pi
η
(
βPs
τeσ2i1
) 2
η
(
1 +
(1− β) τe
β (N − 1)
)−(N−1)
×
∫
∞
0
exp (−t) t
2
η
−1dt
(d)
=
pi
η
(
βPs
τeσ2i1
) 2
η
(
1 +
(1− β) τe
β (N − 1)
)−(N−1)
Γ
(
2
η
)
,
(34)
where in (b) we have used u = d2si, in (c) we have used
t =
τeσ
2
i1
βPs
u
η
2 , and (d) follows from the definition of the gamma
function. We then derive J2 as
J2
=
∫
∞
0
∫ pi
0
dsi exp
(
−
τeσ
2
i2
Pr
(
d2sr + d
2
si−2dsrdsi cos θ
) η
2
)
ddsidθ.
(35)
We further derive J3 as
J3
=
(
1 +
(1− β) τe
β (N − 1)
)−(N−1) ∫ ∞
0
∫ pi
0
dsi exp
(
−
τeσ
2
i1
βPs
dηsi
)
× exp
(
−
τeσ
2
i2
Pr
(
d2sr+d
2
si−2dsrdsi cos θ
) η
2
)
ddsidθ. (36)
Substituting (34), (35), and (36) into (29), we obtain the
desired result in (20), which completes the proof.
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